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AUTOMATIC STAY UNDER THE 1978
BANKRUPTCY CODE: AN EQUITABLE
ROADBLOCK TO SECURED
CREDITOR RELIEF
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 substantially altered prior
automatic stay and injunction practice. This Comment attempts
to define the boundaries of section 362 of the code and the terms
'for cause" and "adequate protection" through a review of legis-
lative history and prior Bankruptcy Act practice. The Comment
also provides practical guidance on the procedural aspects of ob-
taining relieffrom stay.
Equity-The spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right-dealing
which would regulate the intercourse of men with meni-the rule of doing
to all others as we desire them to do to us; or, as it is expressed by Justin-
ian, "to live honestly to harm nobody, to render to every man his due."
1
INTRODUCTION
In a typical credit transaction, the creditor provides the debtor
with money or goods in exchange for the debtor's promise to pay
at a future date.2 In order to protect his interest the creditor will,
in many instances, take a security interest in property owned by
the debtor. That security interest helps protect the creditor's
claim from the claims of competing creditors and the potential
trustee in bankruptcy.
3
If the debtor defaults in payment, the creditor may foreclose on
his bargained-for security interest and receive payment from the
1. BLAcK's LAw DicTioNARY 634 (4th ed. 1951).
2. A "debtor" in bankruptcy means a person or municipality for which a case
under the bankruptcy code has been commenced. 11 U.S.C. app.'§ 102(12) (Supp.
I 1978). The new bankruptcy code has substituted the word "debtor" for "bank-
rupt" as a means of reducing the stigma connected with the term bankrupt. H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HousE RE-
PORT]. Unless otherwise stated, reference to a given section will refer to that sec-
tion in 11 U.S.C. app. (Supp. II 1978).
3. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Credi-
tors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
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sale of the debtor's property. However, if the creditor institutes a
suit in the state courts to foreclose on his lien, the debtor may
choose to file one of a variety of petitions in bankruptcy.4 When
the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, the creditor's action'to
foreclose on the lien is automatically stayed 5 and his state court
suit may soon be removed to federal court.6 Unless the creditor
affirmatively seeks and receives relief from the automatic stay,
his bargained-for remedy may be postponed for several years
while the debtor continues to use the money or goods originally
advanced. Although the concept of "automatic stay" and the pro-
cedures for gaining relief were developed under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act,7 the Bankruptcy Code applied in cases filed after
October 1, 1979 is completely new.8
This Comment provides the non-prime or consumer lender with
an understanding of the alternatives available under the new
Bankruptcy Code when the creditor's attempts to foreclose on a
security interest are stayed by the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Such an understanding is gained through an analysis of
(1) the underlying equitable concepts of bankruptcy, (2) the oper-
ation of stays under the Act, (3) the automatic stay under the
Code, and (4) the definitions of the terms "for cause" and "ade-
quate protection." This Comment will attempt to define the pa-
rameters of the above concepts in terms of prior and current case
law. This Comment demonstrates that, while the new Code pro-
vides workable equitable principles to govern the operation of au-
tomatic stays and the use of collateral, it fails to provide
predictability upon which a secured creditor can base future deal-
ings.
AUTOMATIC STAY
The relationships between debtors and creditors have not al-
ways been as equitable as they are today. During the reign of the
laws of the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.), a man who was indebted to
4. Depending on the nature and extent of the debtor's financial problem, the
debtor might file a voluntary petition (§ 301) under chapters 7 (liquidations), 9
(adjustments of debts of a municipality), 11 (reorganizations), or 13 (adjustments
of debts of an individual with regular income).
5. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362 (Supp. H 1978). This section stops virtually all civiJ
proceedings against the debtor automatically upon the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1478(a) (Supp. II 1978).
7. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
8. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. H 1978)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 will hereinafter be referred to as the "Code" or "new law." The terms "Act"
and "prior law" refer to the Bankruptcy Statute of 1898 as amended. See Chandler
Act, Bankruptcy Revision, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
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several creditors and could not pay his debts was subject to hav-
ing his body cut up and divided amongst his creditors.9 If there
was only one creditor, the debtor could have been enslaved or put
to death.1O Although Americans have not treated debtors barbari-
cally, they have traditionally attached a social stigma to the con-
cept of bankruptcy." One modern definition of a bankrupt is a
person who, to avoid payment of his debts, secretes himself, flees
the country, and defrauds or simply avoids his creditors, and is in
consequence legally a criminal.12
The modernization of debtor and creditor relations in America
has occurred through the systematic development of a compre-
hensive bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy power is granted to
Congress in the United States Constitution.'3 In 1898 Congress
enacted the first substantial bankruptcy law,14 patterning it after
the English bankruptcy system.'5 This Act was subsequently
amended more than fifty times with the most substantial revision
being the Chandler Act of 1938.16
On October 1, 1979, a new bankruptcy statute became effec-
tive.'7 The new law, commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code,"
is the first major revision of title 11 of the United States Code in
forty years.18 This enactment is the culmination of more than ten
years of congressional hearings, commission studies, and institu-
tional reports.19
The fundamental approach of the new Code is a continuation of
the two basic goals inherent in bankruptcy law: (1) to provide su-
pervised collection of the debtor's property for an equitable liqui-
dation and distribution to creditors; and (2) to give the debtor a
9. S. SHERWIN, HOW TO GET OUT OF DEBT PAINLESsLY 47 (1969).
10. Id.
11. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1951).
12. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 172 (3rd ed. 1967).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 stat. 544.
15. Hamilton, Automatic Stay-Chapter XI Rule 11-44: Rationale, Application,
Implication, 12 SUFFOLU U.I. REV. 891 (1978). The English System had been pat-
terned after the Roman System. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R!. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 674 (1935).
16. PRACTICING LAW INSTrrUTE, SECURED CREDITORS AND LESSORS UNDER THE
BANKRuPTcy ACT OF 1978 at 12 (1979).
17. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1978)).
18. Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64 A.B.A.J. 1865 (1978).
19. See Kennedy, The Background of the Bankruptcy Law of 1978, in BANK-
RUPTCY AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION: MOVmN INTO NEW TwIES (1979).
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fresh start in life.20 The automatic stay upon the filing of a peti-
tion in bankruptcy is a tool utilized by the bankruptcy courts to
achieve these two purposes.
21
The automatic stay is designed to give the debtor a breathing
spell from his creditors as well as to preserve what remains of his
insolvent estate for the benefit of unsecured creditors.2 2 The
debtor is relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy because the new automatic stay stops virtually all col-
lection efforts, harassment, and foreclosure actions.23 The stay is
also designed to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for
the debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in
different courts.24 In rehabilitation proceedings the stay provides
the debtor an opportunity to negotiate a plan of arrangement with
his creditors without having the hope of rehabilitation extin-
guished by immediate repossession of his encumbered property
by secured creditors.
25
The automatic stay can have a significant effect on the time the
creditor receives payment. Indications are that the inclusion of
broader wage earner laws in chapter 13 of the Code has and will
continue to increase consumer bankruptcy filings significantly.2
6
Therefore, creditors should be familiar with the Code and with
20. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970); see also Kuehner v. Irving Trust
Co., 299 U.S. 447 (1936), where, in discussing reorganization proceedings, the Court
stated that "the object of bankruptcy laws is the equitable distribution of the
debtor's assets amongst his creditors; and the validity of the challenged provision
must be tested by its appropriateness to that end." Id. at 551. See also Donnelly,
The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act; The Development of Its Structured Provi-
sions and Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 291, 318 (1978) discussing the impact of the traditional American concern for
human dignity on wage earner considerations.
21. See Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 177
(1978).
22. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 340.
23. Id.; 11 U.S.C. app. § 362 (Supp. HI 1978).
24. Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc,, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1976). The
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 340, states "[tihe automatic stay also provides
creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their
own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain
payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.
Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which
all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's
assets prevents that."
25. In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp., 13 COLLIER BANRa. CAs. 77 (E.D. Tenn.
1977). A rehabilitation proceeding, reorganization, and arrangement are all pro-
ceedings in which the debtor utilizes the court to extend or modify his debts. In a
traditional straight bankruptcy, the debtor's non-exempt property is turned over to
the court which distributes or sells the property for the benefit of creditors.
26. PRACTICING LAw INsTrrU, SECURED CREDITORS AND LESSORS UNDER THE
BANxRuPTCY ACT OF 1978 at 12 (1979) (consumer bankruptcy filings have increased
in recent years to over several hundred thousand filings per year). This statement
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their own financial limitations before extending credit to a con-
sumer or small businessman.
Before the advent of automatic stays, the bankruptcy courts
used injunctions to protect debtors and their estates from credi-
tors.27 The Supreme Court in Ex Parte Christy28 inferred from
the bankruptcy statutes existing in 1841 that the power to issue
injunctions was inherent in these statutes because, without such
power, the courts could not carry out the purposes of the bank-
ruptcy system. The first "automatic stay" was enacted in 1933 as
section 75(o) of the first relief for farmers legislation. 29 Section
75(s), added in 1934 by the Frazier-Lemke Act, provided for an au-
tomatic stay of all proceedings against a farmer-debtor's property
for five years.30 The United States Supreme Court promptly held
section 75(s) unconstitutional as a violation of fifth amendment
due process in the celebrated case of Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford.31
The passing of the Chandler Act of 1938 added business reor-
ganization chapters X, XI, and XII to the Bankruptcy Act and
provided for automatic stays in two sections. 32 Prior to the enact-
ment of these sections, stays in bankruptcy were not always self-
executing.33 Before an injunction could be effected, it was neces-
sary for the court to receive some affirniative motion by the
trustee, receiver, or debtor.34 However, under this practice, debt-
ors lost substantial portions of their estates between the time of
filing in bankruptcy and the issuance of the injunction.35 The
Chandler Act remedied this problem by making stays auto-
is also based on observations of filings in the Southern District of California Bank-
ruptcy Court since October 1, 1979.
27. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 362.01(1) (15th ed. L. King 1979).
28. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292 (1845).
29. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1473; Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy, 11 U. Mici. J.L. REF. 177, 180 (1978). The stay was "automatic" in the
sense that a stay was applied upon the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and no
separate application for an injunction was needed.
30. Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934); Kennedy, supra note 29, at
180.
31. 295 U.S. 555 (1935); see also note 125 infra.
32. 2 COLLIER ON BANKuPTcy 1 362.01(2) (15th ed. L. King 1979); Bankruptcy
Act §§ 148, 428, 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 828 (1976).
33. 2 COLLIER ON BAxRuprcY 362.01(2) (15th ed. L King 1979).
34. Id.
35. Coney Island Hotel Corp. v. Van Schaick, 76 F.2d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 1935).
See also note 24 supra.
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matic.36
Between 1973 and 1976 eight new rules were added to the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure in an attempt to fill in the gaps created
by the Chandler Act stay provisions.37 One of the major problems
with the Act and the rules was that the stay provisions were lo-
cated in different parts of the Act and each one provided a differ-
ent rule of application. Confusion also resulted because several
of the rules provided for different periods of duration and conflict-
ing prerequisites for gaining relief from the stay.38 For example,
Rule 401 provided a stay against enforcement of actions or judg-
ments founded on dischargeable provable debt39 Rule 601 pro-
vided a stay against proceedings to enforce liens against property
in the custody of the bankruptcy court and liens against debtor
property obtained within four months of bankruptcy by attach-
ment, judgment, levy, or other equitable or legal process or pro-
ceedings;40 and Rules 13-401, 11-44, 10-601, 12-43, 8-501, and 9-4 each
provided a rule of particular applicability to the chapter in which
they are contained.
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code captures the spirit of a con-
fusing array of provisions under both the old Act and the rules.41
Section 362 provides extensive procedural and equitable stan-
dards for automatic stays upon the filing of a voluntary, joint, or
involuntary petition in cases under chapters 7 (liquidations), 9
(adjustments of debts of a municipality), 11 (reorganizations),
and 13 (adjustments of debts of an individual with regular in-
come). 42 Additional specialized stay provisions are contained in
the various subchapters to limit or expand the stay provided in
section 362.43
36. Chandler Act, chap. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
37. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976). Order of Apr. 24, 1973, 411 U.S. 991 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1973); Order of Mar. 18, 1974, 415 U.S. 1005 (effective July 1, 1974) [here-
inafter cited as R. BANK& P.].
38. See, e.g., R. BANKXE P. 13-401(d) (standing requirement for relief of stay), 8-
501 (no expressed standing requirement for relief of stay), 401 (stay continues un-
til bankruptcy case is dismissed or the bankrupt is denied a discharge or waives or
otherwise loses his right thereto), 601 (stay shall continue until the banluptcy
case is dismissed or closed, or until the property subject to the lien is, with the
approval of the court, set apart as exempt, abandoned, or transferred).
39. R. BANKP. P. 401(a) (1979).
40. R. BANKR. P. 601(a) (1979).
41. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 1 362.01 (15th ed. L. King 1979); see Chandler
Act §§ 16, 148, 314, 414, 428, 614, 11 U.S.C. §§ 34, 548, 714, 814, 828, 1014 (1976); R.
BAN.m P. 401, 601, 13-401, 11-44, 10-601, 12-43, 8-501, 9-4.
42. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 362, 103(a), 901(a) (Supp. H 1978).
43. See 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 742 (allowing the Securities Investor Protection Cor-
poration to file a protective decree under the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 and staying proceedings under chapter 7), 922 (staying proceedings by an of-
ficer or inhabitant of the debtor to enforce a claim against the debtor), 1110 (ex-
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Upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, section 362 stays vir-
tually all court proceedings and collection efforts directed against
the debtor. Section 362(b) lists eight exiceptions under which a
creditor's action is not stayed. The exceptions are: (1) criminal
actions or proceedings against the debtor, (2) collection of ali-
mony, maintenance, and support from non-estate property, (3)
any act to perfect an interest in property to a limited extent, (4)
governmental actions to enforce poli~e or regulatory powers, (5)
enforcement of non-money judgments obtained in governmental,
police, or regulatory proceedings, (6) set-offs involving mutual
debts and claims in certain securities, (7) foreclosure of certain
properties by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
and (8) issuances of notices of tax deficiency.44
Section 362(b) (3) allows the continued perfection of interests in
the debtor's property against persons acquiring rights in the prop-
erty before the date of actual perfection.45 This section is limited
to situations in which continued perfection is allowed by applica-
ble law.46 For example, a state that has adopted Uniform Com-
mercial Code section 9-301(2) can allow a purchase money
security interest to relate back and defeat an earlier perfected
non-purchase-money security interest if the former is perfected
within ten days.47 The stay is effective on the date the petition is
fled,48 and the fact that a person subject to the stay has not re-
ceived notice and has no knowledge of the filing of the petition
does not alter the effectiveness of the stay.4 9 Subsequent to the
filing of the petition by the debtor, any action taken by the credi-
tor contrary to the stay is void and without effect unless the stay
empting from stay under particular circumstances parties holding purchase
money security interests in certain aircrafts, space parts, and vessels of the United
States), 1168 (exempting from stay certain parties with purchase money security
interests in railroad rolling stock and equipment), 1301 (staying civil actions
against co-debtors on nonbusiness consumer debts) (Supp. H 1978).
44. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 362(b) (1)-362(b) (8) (Supp. 111978). The exceptions to the
automatic stay do not prevent the possibility that the debtor may obtain an injunc-
tion to enjoin creditors exempt from the stay when necessary. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 342. 11 U.S.C. app. § 105(a) (Supp. 11 1978) provides that "[tihe
bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
45. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 362(b) (3), 546(b) (Supp. 1 1978).
46. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 371.
47. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(a) (Supp. 1 1978).
49. In re Ducich, 3 COLLER BANKm. CAs. 733, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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itself is annulled.5 0
Another important enhancement of the Code's automatic stay
provisions is the court's expanded jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1481. Under the prior Act, the power of the bankruptcy courts to
stay actions on suits was limited to those suits that involved prop-
erty that was in the actual or constructive possession of the
court.5 ' The new Code has broadened the jurisdiction of the court
to include matters in law, equity, and admiralty.52 Thus, the ac-
tions of the court can affect property heretofore not within its ju-
risdiction.
5 3
Once the automatic stay has halted the creditor's suit, the cred-
itor must request relief from the stay in order to foreclose on his
lien.5 4 Unless such relief is requested, the stay against actions or
suits against property of the estate will remain in force until the
property is no longer the property of the estate.5 5 The stay
against any other act will continue until the time the case is
closed or dismissed or a discharge is granted.5 6 Although the au-
tomatic stay does not suspend the statute of limitations period
applicable to an action on a claim, a creditor subject to a stay will
be allowed only thirty days after notice of termination of the stay
in which to commence a suit.
5 7
Section 362(d) provides that "on request of a party in interest
and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from
the stay ... by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning
the stay."5 8 Under the Act, a proceeding for relief of stay is com-
menced by the filing of a complaint with the court.5 9 Until the
new rules of bankruptcy procedure are promulgated, the old rules
50. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Food
Corp., 536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976); but see 11 U.S.C. app. § 549(c) (Supp. II 1978).
51. 2 COWLIER ON BANxRuPTCY 1 362.01(1)-362.01(2) (15th ed. L King 1979).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. II 1978); HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 448. These
powers are limited to the extent that a bankruptcy court may not enjoin another
court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of
the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.
53. 1 COWIER ON BA Nxup'rcy 3.01(2), (5) (15th ed. L. King 1979); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1471, 1478 (Supp. 11 1978).
54. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (Supp. II 1978).
55. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(c) (1) (Supp. II 1978).
56. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(c) (2) (Supp. II 1978). See also 11 U.S.C. app. § 727(a)
(Supp. II 1978) (in a change from prior law, this section does not allow corpora-
tions or partnerships a discharge in an attempt to curb the practice of individuals
"trafficking in corporate shells and in bankrupt partnerships"); HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 384, 11 U.S.C. app. § 524 (Supp. II 1978) (operation of discharge);
11 U.S.C. app. § 524(c) (d) (Supp. II 1978) (in a change from prior law limits the
ability of individuals to reaffirm their debts).
57. 11 U.S.C. app. § 108(c) (Supp. II 1978).
58. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (Supp. II 1978).
59. R. BANK. P. 401(c), 601(c), 701(b), 703 (1979).
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will remain in effect to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with the code.60 The Southern District of California provides that
a request for relief from automatic stay shall be brought by com-
plaint.61 Upon filing the complaint the clerk of the court will issue
a form entitled "Summons and Notice of Request for Relief of
Stay. '62 The summons and complaint must be served on the
debtor within three days.63 Although the request for relief of stay
is made by complaint the action is really more like a motion.64
After the request and complaint for relief from stay have been
filed and served on the debtor, the creditor will receive relief from
the stay in thirty days, unless the court, after notice and a hear-
ing, orders the stay continued pending a final hearing.65 If a final
hearing is ordered, it must be commenced within thirty days after
the preliminary hearing.66 This procedure is an improvement
over the relief from stay hearings under the Act. In a proceeding
under the Act, the period between filing a complaint for relief
from stay and having an adversary trial on that issue was often
very long.67 This was partly because of the cumbersome compul-
sory counterclaim provision of the rules.68 The House Report
helps to expedite the hearing procedure by indicating its intent
60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, PuB. L. No. 95-598 § 405(d) (1978).
61. United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California General
Order 106, Rule 28 (1979).
62. Id.
63. Id. Under . BANKEL P. 704, the complaint must be served within 10 days.
The special summons used in the new relief from stay request is only valid for 30
days.
64. United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California form
CSD-302 (Dec. 5, 1979). See also R. BANK. P. 401(c), 601(c), 701(b), 703 (1979). In
the case of In re Groundhog Mountain Corp., 4 COLTER BANKR. CAS. 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), Judge Babitt stated that, "Given the reality, what is sought is neither more
nor less than an order granting relief from an injunction, a fit aspect of ordinary
motion practice and not a plenary suit." See also Smith, The Secured Creditor's
Complaint: Relieffrom the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy, 65 CAL L. REV. 1216
(1977), where the author favored the promulgation of a motion for relief from stay
in the new rules of bankruptcy procedure, no matter what form the commence-
ment of a relief action takes, the legislative history has limited the proceeding to
something less than a plenary suit. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 344.
65. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(e) (Supp. H 1978).
66. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(e)(2) (Supp. I 1978).
67. See generally Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 177, 229 (1978). See, e.g., In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D.C.
Utah 1964) (over one year).
68. R. BANK&. P. 713 (1979). Under this rule the creditor is required to com-
bine all claims against the bankrupt in one proceeding. These delays were also
caused by the court's failure to honor calendar priority afforded to relief from stay
actions.
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that counterclaims and collateral claims will not be entertained in
proceedings commenced under section 362(d).69
In Code cases, the preliminary and final hearings will be limited
to the issues relevant to whether the factors necessary to prolong
the stay have been satisfied.7 0 The question that remains in reor-
ganization cases is whether the limited issues considered in sec-
tion 362(e) will be expanded when the relief from stay
proceedings are held before the debtor's plan is confirmed.
71
Under the Act, there was a chance that the relief from stay action
would be heard after the confirmation hearing.72 In prior chapter
XI cases, the debtor's affirmative action in achieving a confirma-
tion of the plan was a key issue in determining whether restraint
would be continued.7
3
Conversely, under the Code, the shortened period in which re-
lief from stay proceedings must be heard could conceivably push
the relief from stay hearing in front of the confirmation hearing.74
The wording of the proposed debtor's plan could have a direct im-
pact on the question of whether the secured creditor's property is
adequately protected.75 Because the confirmation of the debtor's
plan is a prerequisite to continuing the stay under section
362(d) (1) and (2),76 it would appear that the confirmation issues
should be resolved before the relief from stay proceeding is
heard.7
7
ADEQUATE PROTECTION VERSUS REALIZATION OF COLLATERAL
The bankruptcy courts represent a legislative attempt to
achieve equity between two competing social interests. 78 The first
69. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 344.
70. Id.
71. In a reorganization the debtor submits a payment plan to the court and the
creditors. The confirmation of the plan is an order by the court allowing the
debtor to rearrange his debts according to the plan.
72. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L REF. 177, 240
(1978).
73. In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp., 13 COLLIER BAmN& CAS. 77, 97 (E.D. Tenn.
1977).
74. See generally notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
75. See generally 11 U.S.C. app. § 361 (Supp. 111978) (formal requirements of
adequate protection).
76. An issue under this section is whether the property is necessary to an ef-
fective reorganization. Logically, this question cannot be completely answered un-
til the actual debtor's plan has been confirmed.
77. Compare the equitable principles of Lincoln Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dye, 115 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1940) and In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp., 13 COLLIER
BAmia. CAs. 77 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) with 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 361-362 (Supp. 11 1978) and
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 344.
78. See generally Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Louisville
Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
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interest is that a creditor holding a security interest in property
should not be deprived of the benefit of his bargain.79 The second
interest is a combination of economic interests including: the
preservation of economic units, jobs, and businesses; the continu-
ation of credit; and the encouragement of the rehabilitation of in-
dividual debtors so that the debtors will not need to resort to
welfare.80 In balancing these competing interests, the courts have
decided that contractual rights, even those obtained without un-
due adhesion, must give way to society's interest in the economic
benefits of debtor rehabilitation.8 ' This result is consistent with
the debtor-oriented approach to automatic stay under both the
prior Act and the new Code.82
Section 362(g) provides that at any hearing concerning relief
from automatic stay, the party requesting relief from stay will
have the initial burden of proof on the issue of whether there is
equity in the debtor's property. The party opposing relief from
stay will have the burden on all other issues.83 "Equity in the
debtor's property" is the value above existing liens that can be re-
alized from the sale of the property for the benefit of unsecured
creditors. For example, if the debtor's property is worth $100,000
and there are $75,000 in existing liens against the property, $25,000
is the equity in the property.
The shift to the creditor of the burden of proof on the issue of
whether the debtor has equity in the property is one of the fea-
tures of the Code most favorable to the debtor. Under the Act the
creditor initiated the relief from stay proceeding and the debtor
generally had the burden of showing cause why the stay should
remain in effect.84 Lack of debtor equity in the secured property
79. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339.
80. See Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: The Development of
Its Structured Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer-Debtors,
18 SmrrA CLARA L. REV. 291, 317 (1978).
81. See generally In re Groundhog Mountain Corp., 4 COLTER BANK& CAS. 387,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (contract rights must give way to purpose of chapter XI);
Miller, The Automatic Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A Catalyst for Rehabilitation or
an Abuse of Creditors' Rights?, 94 BANKING LJ. 676, 678 (1977). See also G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351 (1977).
82. See generally Note, Automatic Stay--Chapter XI Rule 11-44: Rationale,
Application, Implication, 12 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 891, 927 (1978).
83. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(g) (Supp. 1 1978).
84. See In re Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 COLLIER BANtal CAS. 657 (D.D.C. 1974); In re
American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 BAmrn. CT. DEC. 715 (N.D. Me. 1976). See also In
re Zekendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court overruled the
bankruptcy referee for placing the burden of proof on the creditor.
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is probably the most significant factor favoring the granting of re-
lief from stay. A greater problem exists for creditors who hold se-
curity in assets that are not easily valued. In some large cases a
proper valuation might take more than 30 days to complete. The
creditor will need to be adequately prepared if he is to meet his
burden of proof within the time constraints of section 362(e).
Thus, the Code places a significant roadblock in the creditor's
quest for relief from stay. Where the debtor has enjoyed the use
of value advanced to him by the creditor, placing the major bur-
den upon the creditor does not appear to be consistent with the
general equitable principles inherent in bankruptcy law.
85
The secured creditor is usually interested in reclaiming his col-
lateral as soon as possible, unless the claim is undersecured and
will be maximized by submitting to the rehabilitation plan of the
debtor.86 Reclaiming collateral is, of course, dependent on the
creditor obtaining relief from the stay. The Code provides alter-
nate grounds for relief of stay. Relief shall be granted "for cause,"
including the lack of "adequate protection" of an interest in prop-
erty of such party in interest,87 or, with respect to a stay of an ac-
tion against property, relief shall be granted if the debtor does not
have "equity in the property" and such property is "not necessary
to an effective reorganization." 88 The statutory term "for cause"
expressly includes the concept of "lack of adequate protection,"
but the legislative history indicates that this is not the only
cause.89 The facts of each request for relief from stay will deter-
mine whether relief is appropriate under the circumstances. 90
Under the Act the term "for cause" was the key to the court's
discretionary power to grant relief from the stay.9 ' Likewise, the
term "adequate protection" was derived from case law prior to
the enactment of the Code.9 2 It is probable that the prior case law
developed in confirmation cases will add little meaning to the
85. See generally note 19 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, the ad-
ded burden is especially inconsistent with cases in which a reorganization is uti-
lized as a means to effectuate a court supervised liquidation plan. See In re Penn
Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951), which theorized that chapter XI was not
a proper means for effecting a protracted liquidation under the Act; and In re Red
Carpet Corp., 11 COLLIER BANK. CAs. 487 (N.D. Fla. 1976), where the court re-
leased the automatic stay partly because the plan was none other than an orderly
liquidation to pay unsecured creditors outside an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding.
86. Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clean Rules v. Ju-
dicial Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 201 (1977).
87. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (1) (Supp. II 1978).
88. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (2) (A)-(B) (Supp. II 1978).
89. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 343-44.
90. Id.
91. R. BANKER. P. 401(d), 601(d), 8-501(c), 9-4(c), 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d), 13-
401(d) (1979).
92. COLLR ON BAmRup'rcY 361.01(1) (15th ed. L. King 1979).
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terms as used in the Code.93 The prior case law- does, however,
illustrate general equitable principles that may be considered by
the courts in the future.94 The Code is young and lacks judicial
definition. The judges of the bankruptcy courts, therefore, must
lay the groundwork for future case interpretation.9 5
In relief from automatic stay and injunction cases under the
Act, the approaches of the different judicial circuits range from
hard and fast rules to wide-open judicial discretion.96 In liquida-
tion cases the general rule under the Act was that the stay would
be dissolved if the court determined that there was no equity be-
yond the secured creditor's interest in the debtor's property
which could be realized for the benefit of the estate.9 7 If there
was a dispute as to the validity of the creditor's lien, the stay was
usually continued as a protection against loss of, or injury to, the
interest of the debtor's estate in the property.9 8
A concern for possible rehabilitation of the debtor led to more
intricate rules in reorganization cases under the Act. In some re-
organization cases the debtor had to show that there was equity
in the property subject to the security interest; that the security
was not in jeopardy because of the delay necessarily caused by
the restraining order; that the possibility of an arrangement be-
tween a debtor and his unsecured interest was essential to the
operation of the debtor's business; and that without a continua-
93. Coller states "that while prior cases may offer some guidance it is more
likely that the courts will turn to prior cases under the Act which dealt with the
matter at hand, that is stays of creditor action, use, sale, or lease of property and
the obtaining of credit, than to be guided by confirmation cases." Id.
94. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339, where in speaking on the subject of
adequate protection the legislature opined that the courts would be expected to
apply the concept in light of the facts in each case and general equitable princi-
ples.
95. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339 (matters are left to case-by-case inter-
pretation). Locally there is concern about whether the relatively small bank-
ruptcy bar will be overly influenced by writers and seminar leaders. See Trost,
Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1309 (1979), in which the author acknowledges Kenneth N. Klee, associate
counsel to the House Judiciary Committee, who was one of the principal drafts-
men of the new Bankruptcy Code. "Mr. Klee's insight into what the draftsmen 'in-
tended' was pointedly and frequently expressed to the author and occasionally his
views influenced the text" Id. at 1309.
96. Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clear Rules v. Ju-
dicial Discretion, 51 Am. BAmm L.J. 197 (1977).
97. In re Haupt & Co., 398 F.2d 607 (2nd Cir. 1968).
98. See Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. McH. J.L. REF. 177,
234 (1978).
1125
tion of the stay the debtor could not consummate the arrange-
ment and the arrangement would be defeated.99 Another set of
rules, developed for reorganization cases, questioned whether an
injunction was necessary to preserve the debtor's estate or carry
out the plan, whether the injunction would impair the security of
the lien, and whether the owner of the secured indebtedness
would be required to accept less than the full periodic payments
specified in his contract.100 Even though in theory these rules
balanced the equities in each case, in application the court often
looked more at whether there was equity in the property than at
anything else. 0 ' Where there was equity in the property to be re-
alized for the benefit of unsecured creditors, courts usually de-
nied relief on that basis alone. 02
The case of In re Lax EnterprisesO3 illustrates the equitable
balancing process which some courts used under the Act. In Lax
the debtor filed a petition for reorganization under chapter XI of
the Act. The secured assets in question were a motel, real estate,
fixtures, and furniture. By utilizing dollar valuations based on
several standard accounting theories, the court found that there
was equity in the property. In determining whether the motel
business would improve in the future, the court also considered
that the Akron area had been affected by the oil embargo, rapid
increases in utility rates, the economic recession's effect on travel,
high unemployment, and a five month rubber strike. Utilizing pol-
icy considerations 0 4 as a yardstick, the court balanced the
debtor's need to use the property, the possible loss of equity in
the security in the near future, and the efforts of the debtor to ef-
fectively increase occupancy of the motel. The court allowed the
creditor to prosecute the foreclosure action to judgment and con-
tinued the injunction against execution of the judgment. How-
99. In re O.K. Motels, 1 CoUER BANKR. CAs. 416 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
100. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 576 (4th Cir. 1963).
101. See Anderson, Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chap-
ter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 36 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976); Peitzman & Smith, The
Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief From Automatic Stays In Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings, 65 CALIF. L REV. 1216, 1228 (1977).
102. In re Atlantic Steel Prod. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
103. 11 COLLIER BANKi. CAs. 628 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
104. "Some of the criteria which might determine whether or not to con-
tinue a stay against enforcement of the lien are the relative amount of the
debtor's equity in the property or the potential of substantial injury to the
secured creditor by loss, destruction or severe diminution of value of the
property, or the debtor's need for the property in effecting the plan with
its unsecured creditors or whether or not insisting upon performance by
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ever, the debtor was required to submit monthly financial reports
to the court for future evaluation and action.
Other case law concepts should be of value to the creditor argu-
ing for relief from the stay. For example, the concepts of "lack of
equity" and "necessity of property for an effective reorganization"
are clearly carried over from prior case law into the Code's alter-
native provisions for relief in cases involving acts against prop-
erty.105 A non-Code concept that may be argued is the "balance-
of-hurt" test.106 The balance-of-hurt test, as the name suggests,
allows the parties to demonstrate how they are being damaged by
either continuation of, or relief from, the stay.107 In C.I. Mortgage
Group v. Nevada Towers Associates,108 the court concluded that
the possibility of the debtor's successful rehabilitation alone did
not mandate the continuation of the stay. The court also consid-
ered whether continuation of the stay would cause the creditor
immediate and irreparable harm.109 Because the bankruptcy
court is basically a court of equity, with a purpose of avoiding in-
justice and unfairness," 0 the debtor should be able to air almost
any grievance under the balance-of-hurt concept. Nevertheless,
the overriding deference of bankruptcy courts toward debtor re-
habilitation will increase the burden on the creditor to demon-
strate significant harm in order to show cause for relief from
stay."'
Under section 362(d) lack of "adequate protection" of a secured
interest is cause for granting relief from stay to a creditor. "Ade-
105. Compare In re Lax, 11 COLLIER BANYx. CAS. 628 (N.D. Ohio 1976) with 11
U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (1)-(2) (Supp. 11 1978) (relief shall be granted if the debtor
does not have equity in the property and the property is not needed for an effec-
tive reorganization).
106. See, e.g., In re Groundhog Mountain Corp., 4 COLTER BANIDL CAs. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the "balance of hurt" suggests that the plaintiff be permitted to
proceed); In re Consolidated Motor Inns, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 18, 31 (N.D. Ga.
1975).
107. In re Groundhog Mountain Corp., 4 COLLIR BANx. CAs. 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); In re Consolidated Motor Inns, 6 COLLIER BANiR. CAS. 18, 31 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
108. 14 COLLR BANc. CAS. 146, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
109. Id.
110. In re Victor Builders, Inc., 418 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969).
111. See Chaplan v. Anderson, 256 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1958) (primary concern in
chapter XI is whether continuation of the stay will lead to material harm); C.I.
Mortgage Group v. Nevada Associates, 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(where the mortgagee would not be seriously harmed by continuation of the stay,
the debtor's rehabilitation should proceed); HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 116-21
(the new chapter 13 should be encouraged to protect consumer debtors against ag-
gressive sales and advertising techniques by consumer creditors).
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quate protection" is a term of art under the Code. However, little
is known about what adequate protection is or will be. The legis-
lative history indicates that the concept of adequate protection is
left to the courts for interpretation and development on a case by
case basis.112 What is known is that adequate protection is
mandatory when requested by a party in interest," 3 and that lack
of adequate protection is cause for terminating, annulling, modify-
ing, or conditioning the stay. 14 Also known is that adequate pro-
tection is not achieved by merely entitling a creditor to receive an
administrative priority,"15 and that adequate protection is proba-
bly not payment ten years in the future. 116 A more precise defini-
tion of adequate protection must be developed on a case by case
basis.
The phrase adequate protection originated in chapter X reor-
ganization cases under the Act." 7 Adequate protection for the re-
alization of value in property dealt with by a reorganization plan
was required when the plan was confirmed over the dissent of a
secured creditor. 18 The concept of adequate protection is derived
from the fifth amendment protection of property interests." 9
However, the concept is equally dependent on policy considera-
tions.12
0
In 1935 the case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford121 listed five substantive rights protected by the fifth amend-
ment. In that case the Court held that the Frazier-Lemke Act
deprived the secured creditor of:
1. The right to retain a lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is
paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only to
the discretion of the court.
4. The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale
whenever held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property de-
voted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of
the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself.
5. The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of de-
fault, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents
112. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339.
113. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 338, 342.
114. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (1) (Supp. H 1978).
115. 11 U.S.C. app. § 361(3) (Supp. H 1978).
116. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (adequate protection
must be completely compensatory, payment in ten years is not the same thing).
117. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy 1 361.01(1) (15th ed. L. King 1979).
118. Id. (Forced confirmation of the debtor's plan is commonly known as "cram
down").
119. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339.
120. Id.
121. 295 U.S. 555, 594 (1935).
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and profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.
1 2 2
Congress then amended the Act, and three years later the
Supreme Court in Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank123 reviewed a
portion of the amended Frazier-Lemke Act and found it constitu-
tional. The new provisions impaired at least two of the five pro-
tected rights, but the Court held that mere impairment of rights
by the use of an automatic stay is not the equivalent of a depriva-
tion of due process.124 Although Radford has been limited by
subsequent cases, 12 5 the right to retain liens until paid in full is
still a factor in the new chapter 13 cramdown provision.1
26
The first step in discerning whether the creditor's interest is ad-
equately protected is to determine the value of the secured credi-
tor's interest. This value is the amount of debt plus any interest
and expenses that would normally be added thereto. 27 The cred-
itor's right to adequate protection is limited to the lesser of the
value of the collateral or the amount of the secured claim.12 8
Under the Constitution there is no right to demand an excess of
collateral value over the amount of the creditor's claim, but main-
taining a margin of security may well be a means of adequate pro-
tection. 2
9
Adequate protection will not necessarily be provided by the
122. Id. These rights were guaranteed by the laws of the State of Kentucky.
The Court went on to find the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional because the au-
tomatic unconsented-to surrender of the property to the bankrupt amounted to a
taking Without eminent domain.
123. 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
124. Id. The major revisions of the Act preserved rights 1, 2, and 4 and left 3
and 5 impaired. The stay under the new Act was not absolute, in terms of length,
and could be terminated earlier than the three years maximum prescribed in the
Act. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
125. 2 COLLIER ON BANaUpTcy 1 362.01(1) (15th ed. L King 1979).
126. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1325(a) (5) (Supp. 11 1978) provides that the court shall
confirm a plan if "[w]ith respect to each allowed secured claim provided by the
plan-(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; (B) (i) the plan provides
that the holder of each such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim;
or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to holder and (D)
the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with
the plan."
127. Levit, Use and Disposition of Property Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code: Some Practical Concerns, 53 AM. BANKa. I.J. 275, 287 (1979).
128. Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clear Rules v. Ju-
dicial Discretion, 51 Am. BANKR L.J. 197, 234 (1977).
129. 2 COLLIER ON BANxRuTcY 362.01(1) (15 ed. L King 1979).
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courts.130 Instead, the trustee or debtor will provide or propose a
method of protection.'13 If the secured party objects, the court
will then step in and determine whether the chosen method pro-
vides adequate protection.1
32
Section 361 of the Code attempts to define the parameters of ad-
equate protection by illustrating three non-exclusive methods.1
33
The first method of providing adequate protection is to require
the trustee to make periodic cash payments to the extent that a
stay, use, sale, lease, or grant of lien results in a decrease in the
value of the creditor's interest in the property.134 In situations in-
volving the use, sale, or lease of collateral under section 363(e),
adequate protection may be provided by periodic cash payments
to the creditor under section 361(1). However, this protection
may be limited to use, sale, or lease by the trustee.13 5 Adequate
protection for use by the debtor could still be demanded under
the relief from automatic stay provisions if the use decreases the
value of the creditor's lien.
36
At the time of this writing the only reported case to consider
adequate protection under the Code is In re Lzm.137 There the
court considered the continued use of a car by the debtor, with a
reduction in car payments, in a chapter 13 rehabilitation. The
creditor argued that the proposed installment payments would
not be the equivalent of the present cash value of the car. The
court applied the law under the prior Act and determined the
value of the car as of the effective date of the plan. The creditor
was allowed ten percent interest per annum on the unpaid bal-
ance of its $5,000 secured claim, with the balance of the claim al-
lowed as unsecured. The actual holding of the court was that the
creditor was "adequately protected" because the debtor's
monthly payments exceeded the monthly depreciation of the
car.13 8 This holding is in accordance with prior decisions regard-
130. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 338.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 11 U.S.C. app. § 361 (Supp. II 1978).
134. 11 U.S.C. app. § 361(1) (Supp. H 1978).
135. 11 U.S.C. app. § 363(e) (Supp. 1 1978) (limits request of adequate protec-
tion limited to use, sale, lease, or proposed use, sale or lease of trustee.).
136. 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(d) (Supp. H 1978) (any party in interest may request
adequate protection).
137. BANKR. L REP. (CCH) 67,254 (1979).
138. The legislative history also provides that "periodic payments may be ap-
propriate where the property in question is depreciating at a relatively fixed rate.
The periodic payments would be to compensate for the depreciation." HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 339.
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ing periodic payments.139
Legislative history indicates that the periodic cash payment
method was derived from In re Yale Express, Inc.140 The Yale Ex-
press case actually conflicts with the goals of the periodic pay-
ment method. The case does recognize periodic payments made
to the creditor by the debtor as a method of protecting creditors
against depreciation, but adds the proviso that full periodic pay-
ments need not be made to all secured creditors if such payments
would endanger the reorganization. 141 The Yale Express ration-
ale could still be viable if it is applied in combination with an ad-
ditional method of adequate protection.
The second suggested method would provide adequate protec-
tion by granting an additional or replacement lien to the extent
that the stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the
value of the creditor's interest in the property.142 The purpose of
this method is to provide the protected entity with a means of re-
alizing the value of the original property, in cases in which the
value of the property declines while the case is pending, by grant-
ing the creditor an interest in additional property of the debtor.143
The third method provides for the granting of other relief which
would result in the realization by the creditor of the "indubitable
equivalent" of the creditor's interest in the property. 44 This
method gives the parties and the courts flexibility to adopt new
methods of financing and create new protections for the creditor
if no other methods would yield the desired results. 45 The
phrase "indubitable equivalent" originated in the case of In re
Murel Holding Corp.146 In that case the court reasoned that al-
though creditors' consent to rehabilitation plans should be ob-
139. See, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Gelormino
Construction Co., 2 BANxL CT. DEC. 39 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
140. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 339; In re Yale Express, Inc., 384 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1967).
141. 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1967). The court declared that any deficiency be-
tween the payment and the actual depreciation could be made up by granting the
creditor an administrative priority. The idea of giving an administrative priority
though has been expressly disapproved by section 361(3).
142. 11 U.S.C. app. § 361(2) (Supp. 1 1978).
143. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 339-40. See also In re American Kitchen
Foods, Inc., 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 436 (N.D. Me. 1976) where to the extent of use
of prepetition collateral the creditor was given a secured claim against all assets of
the debtor.
144. 11 U.S.C. app. § 361(3) (Supp. H 1978).
145. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 340.
146. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
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tained, if the plan was confirmed without it, the plan must provide
adequate protection for the realization by the creditors of the full
value of their interest, claims, or liens.14 7 The court envisioned
adequate protection being met in four ways: (1) the liens may be
kept in status quo with the reorganization limited to the equity,
(2) the property may be sold free and clear and the liens attached
to the proceeds, (3) the value of the liens may be appraised and
paid, and (4) the judge is given the power to provide equitably
and fairly such protection as is needed when the other methods
are not chosen.148 These requirements insure that the secured
creditor will not be subordinated to junior interests unless by a
substitute interest of the most indubitable equivalence.1
49
The indubitable equivalent alternative is broad and should pro-
mote innovative equitable solutions. One authority has stated
that "[t]he last alternative should be applied narrowly in a man-
ner consistent with the stand of the Murel case bearing in mind
that a mere indubitable equivalent is demanded rather than the
most indubitable equivalence."' 5 0 While the first and second
methods may be fraught with collateral valuation problems,151 the
third method will adapt to the circumstances of each case, not
binding the courts with hard and fast rules.152
Although the Code expressly provides for adequate protection
of the value of the secured party's interest, it fails to protect the
creditor's bargained-for cash flow. General indications are that
where the secured collateral is appreciating in value, the passage
147. Id. at 942.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 2 COLLIER ON B.ANxuprcy 361.01(4) (15th ed. L King 1979).
151. The time and method of valuing the collateral, for adequate protection pur-
poses, is not prescribed by the Code or the legislative history. Apparently this
question was left open to allow the courts to apply the concept in light of the facts
in each case with general equitable principles. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at
339. The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recommended that adequate protec-
tion be measured by the liquidation value of the collateral as of the date of the
petition. This recommendation would have protected the creditor more, in that
liquidation valuation historically is lower than valuation made as a going concern.
The legislature, however, rejected the recommendation in favor of the vague lan-
guage of section 361. See Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the
New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1309 (1979).
152. The creditor faces other dilemmas in declaring valuation on the collateral.
If the creditor asserts a high collateral valuation he runs the risk that the court
will find adequate protection without providing any additional protection. Con-
versely, a low collateral valuation may not be believed, and can lead to unexpected
results. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 361.02 (15th ed. L. King 1979). One of the
most pressing problems is how to determine the value of the collateral over time.
In McGill v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 F. 637, 647 (D. Md. 1917), Judge Rose
stated that "the effort is to find out ... what a purely imaginary buyer will pay a
make-believe seller, under circumstances which do not exist." See also HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 339.
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of time alone constitutes adequate protection. However, the cred-
itor may be able to use the third method to show extreme hard-
ship or other "balance of hurt" in order tO secure cash flow as the
indubitable equivalent of his bargained-for interest. The credi-
tor's failure to demand adequate protection persuasively could re-
sult in delaying payment for up to ten years after the filing of the
petition. 5 3 As chapter 13 filings increase, the creditor may soon
come to expect delay in payments of up to five years. 54
The actual combinations of possible arguments by the creditor
in relief from stay actions are limited only by the creditor's imagi-
nation. Arguments which can be made are: (a) the anticipated
decrease in value of the interest should be measured by project-
ing the ultimate liquidation value at a distress sale, 5 5 (b) the pro-
longed period of the stay will adversely affect the security or
business, 5 6 (c) the rehabilitation plan of the debtor could never
work, 57 (d) the rehabilitation plan could only work on the hap-
pening of a remote contingency,S8 (e) the alternatives to current
full payment are not completely compensatory, 5 9 and (f) the
means by which the debtor brought about his financial problems
are considered socially deplorable. 160 No matter what argument
the creditor uses, it can be anticipated that the bankruptcy sys-
tem will balance the equitable scale squarely against the creditor
seeking immediate realization of the collateral. If on a first at-
tempt the creditor is unable to gain satisfaction, he may try again
at a later date, because property value is subject to change during
pendency of the case.161 The creditor should also be aware that, if
153. Compare In re Murel Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (payment in 10 years
is not indubitable equivalent of current foreclosure on property) with 11 U.S.C.
app. § 1322(c) (Supp. II 1978) (chapter 13 plan cannot provide for payments ex-
ceeding five years) and 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129 (Supp. 1 1978) (chapter 11 only limits
plan to six years for certain governmental priority claims).
154. Compare 11 U.S.C. app. § 1322(c) (Supp. 1 1978) with Di Pietro, Unlucky
Numberfor the Uninformed Lawyer, 53 CoxN. B.J. 176 (1979) (where the author
suggested that in the future it might well be malpractice not to run a consumer
debtor through a rehabilitation plan).
155. See also Levit, Use and Disposition of Property Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Some Practical Concerns, 53 Am. BANK& LJ. 275 (1979).
156. See also In re Bermec, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
157. See also In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1964).
158. See also In re Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 657 (D. D.C. 1974).
159. See also In re Murel Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
160. See also In re Thompson, 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973) (court may consider
how debtor got into trouble).
161. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L REF. 177, 246
(1978).
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he is harmed by the implementation of adequate protection by
the trustee, he will be given priority to all other unsecured claims
to the extent the debt becomes unsecured.1
62
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gives the American bank-
ruptcy system an opportunity for a fresh start. The vague terms
of the automatic stay provisions and the congressional intention
to allow case-by-case development of the new provisions will al-
low the Code to adapt equitably to almost any factual situation.
Court decisions over the next few years will set the trend for
what a secured creditor can expect when his security interest
remedy is stayed in bankruptcy.
The new Code offers a comprehensive improvement over the
Act by consolidating the provisions for automatic stay into one
section. The provisions for expedited relief from stay hearings al-
low the secured creditor to move quickly to obtain relief from
stay. However, the shift in the intitial burden of proof on the is-
sue of equity in the property appears to place an inequitable bur-
den on the secured creditor. Unless the creditor can show that
there is no equity in the debtor's property, he may not get a
chance to argue the issue of adequate protection. Having only
thirty days to value the debtor's property may also prove to be an
undue burden on a creditor who has a security interest in prop-
erty that is difficult to value.
The creditor must be careful to use the proper forms and be
mindful of the special service of summons requirements. Failure
to abide by the special requirements prevents the court from hav-
ing jurisdiction to hear the creditor's request, resulting in a loss of
both time and money.
The terms "for cause" and "adequate protection" are in need of
refinement and reliable definition. At present, a secured creditor
can only guess whether the transaction he enters into today will
afford him the security and guaranteed payment that he bar-
gained for.
In the future the courts should fashion remedies that are equi-
table. The new Code, even with adequate protection, can result in
inequitable treatment of secured creditors. While the Code and
the concept of bankruptcy seek to foster many important social
goals, it would be improvident to require the secured creditor to
carry the burden of every debtor's rehabilitation effort. If the
spirit of equity is truly the habit of fairness and justness and ren-
162. 11 U.S.C. app. § 507(b) (Supp. II 1978).
1134
[voL. 17: 1113, 1980]
dering to every man his due, the concepts
tomatic stay have a long way to evolve.
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